We consider the problem of increasing the threshold parameter of a secret-sharing scheme after the setup (share distribution) phase, without further communication between the dealer and the shareholders. Previous solutions to this problem require one to start off with a non-standard scheme designed specifically for this purpose, or to have secure channels between shareholders. In contrast, we show how to increase the threshold parameter of the standard CRT secret-sharing scheme without secure channels between the shareholders. Our method can thus be applied to existing CRT schemes even if they were set up without consideration to future threshold increases.
Introduction
Background. A (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, which allows a dealer owning a secret to distribute this secret among a group of n shareholders in such a way that any t shareholders can reconstruct the secret, but no subset of less than t shareholders can gain information on the secret. Two classical constructions for (t, n) secret-sharing schemes are the integer-based Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) scheme [18, 1] and the Shamir polynomial-based scheme [21] .
A common application for (t, n) secret-sharing schemes is for achieving robustness of distributed security systems. A distributed system is called robust if system security is maintained even against an attacker who manages to break into/eavesdrop up to a certain number of components of the distributed system. For example, access control to a system can be enforced using a secret shared among n system servers using a (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme, while maintaining security if less than t servers are compromised. In such applications, the threshold parameter t must be determined by a security policy, based on an assessment which is a compromise between the value of the protected system and attacker resources and capabilities on the one hand (which require as high a threshold as possible) and user convenience and cost on the other hand (which require as low a threshold as possible). In many settings, the system value and attacker capabilities are likely to change over time, thus requiring the security policy and hence threshold parameter t to vary over time. In particular, an increase in system value or attacker capabilities after the initial setup with a relatively low threshold parameter t, will require an increase in the threshold parameter to a higher value t > t. The longer the lifetime of the system, the more likely that such a change will be needed.
for 'Noisy Chinese Remaindering in the Lee Norm' due to Shparlinski and Steinfeld [22] . The authors of [22] left it as an open problem to find a cryptographic application of their algorithm. Our work shows one such application. We remark also that although the correctness proof of our scheme is based on the work of [22] , our security proof is new and the lattice-based techniques used may be of independent interest. Indeed, our results provide a (probabilistic) lower bound on the number of solutions to the noisy Chinese remaindering problem when the solution is not unique, whereas [22] only analyze the case when the solution is unique (up to an interval).
Strong provable statements on the security of the standard CRT secret-sharing scheme have been recently obtained by Quisquater et al [19] , improving on previous results by Goldreich et al [8] . Our proven security result for the changeable-threshold variant of the standard CRT scheme uses entirely different techniques. Although our security result for the changeable-threshold CRT scheme is not as strong as those obtained in [19] for the standard CRT scheme, we believe it is still sufficient for many applications.
We would like to remark on the relation between our threshold increase method and the method for making secret-sharing schemes robust against cheating shareholders using error-correction [17] . In both methods, the share combiner (for a scheme with threshold t) receives t > t 'noisy' shares and applies an error-correction algorithm to overcome the noise and recover the secret. However, the type of noise which needs to be corrected (and hence also the decoding algorithm) is inherently different in the two cases. In the cheater robustness case, the noise vector (whose ith entry is the additive error in the ith share) is bounded in the Hamming norm: if the number of cheating shareholders is at most k then we know that up to k of the t shares will be arbitrarily corrupted while the remaining shares will be correct. In our threshold increase case, the noise vector is bounded in the Lee norm: we have that all t shares are corrupted but only by a small (in absolute value) additive noise. Note that a Hamming-bounded noise is not suitable for our threshold-increase method: we require that all shares be corrupted in an identical manner, to ensure that any subset of t shareholders cannot obtain information on the secret, and any subset of t > t shareholders can recover the secret. On the other hand, our Lee-bounded noise error-correction method cannot handle the Hamming-bounded noise where some shares are arbitrarily corrupted.
Chinese Remainder codes are well known in communication applications as error-correction codes [7] . As mentioned above, our share combiner algorithm (and the related algorithm of [22] ) can be viewed as an error-correction algorithm for a Chinese Remainder code variant, correcting noise bounded in the Lee norm. However, we are not aware of communication applications for this type of errorcorrection. In such applications the Hamming-bounded noise seems more relevant. Appropriate Hamming-bounded noise error-correction algorithms for Chinese Remainder Codes are discussed in [8, 5] .
Finally, we remark that in a companion paper [23] , we show that lattice-based methods can also be used to change the threshold of the standard Shamir [21] polynomial-based secret-sharing scheme. The general ideas and results obtained for the Shamir scheme are analogous to those obtained here for the CRT scheme, although they differ in the details of the lattices involved.
Organization of This Paper. Section 2 presents definitions and known results on lattices, and a number-theoretic lemma that we use. In Section 3, we provide definitions of changeable-threshold secret-sharing schemes and their correctness/security notions. In Section 4 we present the original CRT (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme, and our threshold-changing algorithms to increase the threshold to t > t. We then provide concrete proofs of the correctness and security properties of our scheme. To improve the readability of the paper, proofs of some lemmas have been omitted from the main text and included in the Appendix.
Preliminaries

Notation
Lee Norm · L,p . For a prime p and an integer z we denote Lee norm of z modulo p as z L,p = min k∈Z Z |z − kp|. More generally, given a vector of n primes p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ), we denote the Lee norm of z modulo p by z L,p = max 1≤i≤n z L,p i .
Infinity Norm · ∞ . For a vector z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ Q n , we denote the infinity norm of z by z ∞ = max 1≤i≤n |z i |.
Sets. For a set S, we denote by #S the size of S. For any set S and integer n, we denote by S n the set of all n-tuples of elements from S and by D(S n ) the set of all n-tuples of distinct elements from S. For integer n, we denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Lattices
Here we collect several known results that we use about lattices, which can be found in [10, 11, 9] . Let {b 1 , . . . , b n } be a set of n linearly independent vectors in IR n . The set
is called an n-dimensional (full-rank) lattice with basis {b 1 , . . . , b n }. Given a basis B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ) ∈ IR n for a lattice L, we define the associated basis matrix M L,B to be the (full-rank) n × n matrix whose ith row is the ith basis vector b i for i = 1, . . . , n. The quantity | det(M L,B )| is called the determinant of the lattice L and is denoted by det(L). Although a given lattice L has an infinite number of bases B, the lattice determinant det(L) is independent of the choice of B (i.e. the absolute value of the determinant of any basis matrix of L is equal to det(L)).
Given a lattice L, the problem of finding a shortest vector in a lattice which is known as the shortest vector problem, or SVP. An algorithm is called a SVP approximation algorithm with · ∞ -approximation factor γ SV P if it is guaranteed to find a lattice vector such that v ∞ ≤ γ SV P min v∈L v ∞ . The celebrated LLL algorithm of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [12] is a polynomial time SVP approximation algorithm with · ∞ -approximation factor γ LLL = n 1/2 2 n/2 .
In this paper we actually need to solve a variation of SVP called the closest vector problem (CVP): given a basis of a lattice L in IR n and a "target" vector t ∈ IR n , find a lattice vector v such that v − t ∞ is minimized. An algorithm is called a CVP approximation algorithm with · ∞ -approximation factor γ CV P if it is guaranteed to find a lattice vector such that v − t ∞ ≤ γ CV P min v∈L v − t . Babai [2] has shown how to convert the LLL algorithm into a polynomial time CVP approximation algorithm with · ∞ -approximation factor γ Bab = n 1/2 2 n/2 . This algorithm suffices for our application.
We need the following definition of successive Minkowski minima of a lattice.
, is the smallest real number such that there exists a set
Note that λ 1 (L) is just the shortest infinity-norm over all non-zero vectors in L.
A classical result is Minkowski's "first theorem" in the geometry of numbers.
The following is a generalization of Minkowski's "first theorem", which is due to Blichfeldt and van der Corput(see [10] ). The original theorem is general and lower bounds the number of lattice points in any origin-symmetric convex set. However, for our purposes the following special case is sufficient.
Theorem 2.2 (Blichfeldt-Corput). Let L be a lattice in IR n and let K denote the origin-centered box {v ∈ IR n : v ∞ < H} of volume V ol(K) = (2H) n . Then the number of points of the lattice L contained in the box K is at least 2 · Int
2 n det(L) + 1, where for any z ∈ IR, Int(z) denotes the largest integer which is strictly less than z.
We will also use the following version of Minkowski's "second theorem" in the geometry of numbers [10] . Similarly to above, it is in fact also a special case of the original theorem.
A Number-Theoretic Lemma
The following is a fundamental lemma that we use, interestingly, for both the correctness and security proofs of our CRT construction. The lemma gives an upper bound on the probability that, for n randomly chosen primes (p 1 , . . . , p n ), there will exist a "small" non-trivial integer z (0 < z < A) such that the integer B · z has "small" residues modulo all the primes p 1 , . . . , p n ( B · z L,p i < H for all i = 1, . . . , n), where B ≥ H is a fixed integer. This lemma is a slight variant of a similar result due to Shparlinski and Steinfeld [22] .
Lemma 2.1. Let P denote a set of primes all exceeding 2 . Fix integers A, H ∈ Z Z A and B ≥ H. Let E ,n ( A, H, B) ⊆ P n denote the set of n-component prime vectors p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) such that there exists z ∈ Z Z A \{0} with B · z L,p < H. The size of the set E ,n ( A, H, B) is upper bounded as follows:
Proof. Suppose that p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) ∈ P n is such that there exists z ∈ Z Z such that
Then, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists δ i ∈ Z Z such |δ i | < H and p i divides B · z + δ i . It follows that p i ∈ S z for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, where S z is the set of prime divisors in P of all integers in the interval
Observe that I(z, H) contains less than 2 H integers, all upper bounded by B · A + H, and we also know that 0 / ∈ I(z, H) because B ≥ H. Hence, using the fact that all primes in P exceed 2 , we find that each integer in I(z, H) is divisible by at most −1 log( B · A + H) primes from P , and we have #S z < 2 H −1 log( B · A + H).
So for each possible choice of z ∈ Z Z A \{0}, there are less than (2 H −1 log( B · A + H)) n "bad" choices for p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) ∈ P n such that (1) is satisfied. Since there are less than A possible values for z, we get the desired bound on the number #E ,n ( A, H, B) of "bad" vectors p.
Definition of Changeable-Threshold Secret-Sharing Schemes
We will use the following definition of a threshold secret-sharing scheme, which is a slight modification of the definition in [19] . Definition 3.1 (Threshold Scheme). A (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme TSS = (GC, D, C) consists of three (possibly probabilistic) efficient algorithms:
1 GC (Public Parameter Generation): Takes as input a security parameter k ∈ N and returns a string x ∈ X of public parameters.
2 D (Dealer Setup): Takes as input a security/public parameter pair (k, x) and a secret s from the secret space S(k, x) ⊆ {0, 1} k and returns a list of n shares s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), where s i is in the ith share space S i (k, x) for i = 1, . . . , n. We denote by
the mapping induced by algorithm D (here R(k, x) denotes the space of random inputs to the probabilistic algorithm D).
3 C (Share Combiner): Takes as input a security/public parameter pair (k, x) and any subset s I = (s i : i ∈ I) of t out of the n shares, and returns a recovered secret s ∈ S(k, x). (here I denotes a subset of [n] of size #I = t).
The correctness, communication efficiency, and security properties of a (t, n)-threshold secret-sharing scheme can be quantified by the following definitions, which are modifications of those in [19] .
Definition 3.2 (Correctness, Efficiency, Security). A (t, n) threshold secret-sharing scheme TSS = (GC, D, C) is said to be:
If the secret recovery failure probability p f is at most δ c , where
and we define s I def = {s i : i ∈ I} for each share vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) and subset I ⊆ [n].
We say that TSS is asymptotically correct if, for any > 0, there exists k 0 ∈ N such that TSS is -correct for all k > k 0 .
2 δ e -efficient: If the (maximal) ratio of share length to secret length is at most δ e , that is
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
3 (t s , δ s , s )-secure with respect to the secret probability distribution P k,x on S(k, x): If, with probability at least 1 − δ s over the choice of public parameters x = GC(k), the worst-case secret entropy loss for any t s observed shares is at most s , that is
with #I ≤ t s . We say that TSS is asymptotically t s -secure with respect to P k,x if, for any > 0 and > 0 there exists k 0 ∈ N such that TSS is (t s , , · k)-secure with respect to P k,x for all k > k 0 .
The following definition of the Threshold Changeability without dealer assistance for a secret sharing scheme is a modification of the definition in [15] .
is called threshold-changeable to t with δ c -correctness, δ e -efficiency and (t s , δ s , s )-security with respect to secret distribution P x,k , if there exist n efficient sub-share generation algorithms
. . , n, and an efficient sub-share combination algorithm C such that the modified (t , n)-threshold scheme TSS = (GC, D , C ), with modified shares
is δ c -correct, δ e -efficient and (t s , δ s , s )-secure with respect to P k,x . TSS is called asymptotically threshold-changeable to (t s , t ) with respect to P k,x if there exist algorithms
. . , n) and C such that the (t , n)-threshold scheme TSS defined above is asymptotically correct and asymptotically t s -secure with respect to P k,x .
Remark on δ c -correctness of a (t, n) scheme. The δ c -correctness requirement, although probabilistic, is quite strong since it is only probabilistic in the choice of public parameter x: With at least 1 − δ c probability, the algorithm GC will output a 'good' scheme parameter x for which the scheme reconstruction works perfectly, i.e. for such x the secret is guaranteed to always be recovered by the combiner from any t shares.
Remarks on (t s , s , δ s )-security. The (t s , s , δ s ) requirement guarantees that with at least 1 − δ s probability, GC will output a 'good' scheme parameter x for which any t s observed shares s I leak at most L k,x (s I ) < s bits of entropy of the secret s. Note that: (1) As for correctness above, in our scheme we can efficiently verify that an x is good, so s need not be negligible, (2) The requirement that L k,x (s I ) < δ s for all s I , is a worst-case requirement and hence much stronger than simply requiring that the average value of L k,x (s I ) is less than δ s , and (3) Assuming the entropy of the secret space is at least k bits, the asymptotic t s -security requirement says that the fraction s /k of the secret entropy lost can be made as small as we wish with a suitably large security parameter k.
4 Threshold-Changeability for Integer-CRT Secret-Sharing
The Standard Integer-CRT Scheme
The standard Integer-CRT (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is defined as follows.
The dealer randomness space is R(k, x) = Z Z P t−1 , where P t−1 is the product of the t − 1 smallest primes among (p 1 , . . . , p n ).
Threshold-Changing Algorithms
Our threshold-changing subshare generation and combination algorithms to change the (t, n)-threshold scheme CRTTSS = (GC, D, C) into a (t , n)-threshold scheme CRTTSS = (GC, D , C ) are defined as follows. Note that the subshare combiner algorithm uses an efficient CVP approximation algorithm A CVP with · ∞ -approximation factor γ CV P . We define Γ CV P = log( γ CV P + 1 ) (if we use the Babai poly-time CVP algorithm, we have Γ CV P ≤ 1 + 0.5(t + 1 + log(t + 1))).
Changing Threshold to t > t 1. H i (s i ) (ith Subshare Generation): To transform share s i ∈ Z Z p of original (t, n)-threshold scheme into subshare t i ∈ Z Z p of desired (t , n)-threshold scheme (t > t) the ith shareholder does the following (for all i = 1, . . . , n):
(a) Determine noise bound H which guarantees δ c -correctness:
with #I = t , do the following:
(a) Build the following (t + 1)
Here H = max( 2 α·k−1 , 1),
n(kt + Γ CV P )) + 2Γ CV P + 5 , B = 2 Γ CV P H, and A = p 0 P t−1 , where P t−1 is the product of the t − 1 smallest primes among (p 1 , . . . , p n ).
,H,A) and the target vector t. Denote by c = (c 1 , . . . , c t , c t +1 ) ∈ Q t +1 the output vector returned by the algorithm, which approximates the closest vector to t in the lattice L CRT (p I , B, H, A).
The recovered secret is s = a mod p 0 . Remark 1. The reason for multiplying the shares s i by the integer B ≥ (γ CV P + 1)H before adding the noise, is that otherwise, the secret may not be uniquely recoverable from the noisy subshares.
Remark 2. It is not difficult to see that our method of adding a 'small' random noise integer r i with |r i | < H to the share multiple Ba modulo each prime p i , is essentially equivalent (in the sense of information on the secret) to passing the residues Ba mod p i through a deterministic function which chops off the log(2H) ≈ α · k least-significant bits of the k-bit residues Ba mod p i , and this also yields shorter subshares than in our method above, yielding (1 − α)-efficiency, instead of 1-efficiency as above. However, since reducing the length of the original shares is not our main goal, we have chosen to present our scheme as above since it simplifies the analysis of our scheme, and also allows for more fine control over the 'noise' bound.
Correctness
The following is a concrete statement of correctness for our scheme. It shows that the choice of the parameter δ F in our scheme suffices to achieve δ c -correctness for all sufficiently large security parameters k.
Theorem 4.1 (Correctness). The scheme CRTTSS (with parameter choice δ c = k −t ) is asymptotically correct. Concretely, the (t , n) scheme CRTTSS is δ c -correct as long as the security parameter k satisfies the inequality
Proof. Let x = (p 0 , p) be a vector of primes which determines an instance of CRTTSS. For a subset
of size #I = t , we say that p is bad with respect to I if there exists a secret s ∈ S k,x = Z Z p 0 and randomness r ∈ Z P t−1 and r
, where a = s + r · p 0 ∈ Z Z A , A = p 0 P t−1 and P t−1 is the product of the t − 1 smallest primes in p. We say that p is bad if there exists I ⊆ [n] of size #I = t such that p is bad with respect to I.
Observe that the failure probability p f in the correctness Definition 3.2 is exactly the probability that a prime vector p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) chosen uniformly at random from the set D(P n k ) is bad. We now deduce an upper bound on the fraction δ of bad vectors in D(P n k ) as a function of the scheme parameters. Suppose that p is bad with respect to some I ∈ [n] with #I = t . This means that there exist a ∈ Z Z A and r = (r i [1] , . . . , r i[t ] ) ∈ (−H, H) t such that C returns the wrong secret
for some vector k = (k 1 , . . . , k t ) ∈ Z Z t . But this means that
where
is the vector returned by A CVP on input the lattice L CRT (p I , B, H, A) with target vector t I = (t 1 , . . . , t t , 0), and
is the lattice vector in L CRT corresponding to a = s + r · p 0 , which satisfies
using a < A and |r i[j] | < H for all j = 1, . . . , t . Since A CVP is a CVP approximation algorithm with . ∞ -approximation factor γ CV P , the lattice vector c which it returns satisfies c − t I ∞ < γ CV P · H.
Applying the triangle inequality, it follows from (6) and (7) that the lattice vector z = c − a k = (z 1 , . . . , z t +1 ) is 'short', namely z ∞ < (γ CV P + 1)H, but is non-zero, namely z t +1 = 0 (using (4)). We conclude that if p is bad with respect to I then there exists an integer z def = | A H z t +1 | which satisfies both 0 < |z| < (γ CV P + 1)A ≤ 2
It now follows from Lemma 2.1 that there is a fraction of at most #E k,t ( A, H, B)/#D(P t k ) ≤ A(2 H log(B A + H)k −1 ) t /#D(P t k ) choices for p I ∈ P t k such that p is bad with respect to I. Since there are n t possible choices for I, we have that the fraction δ of bad vectors in D(P n k ) is upper bounded as
It is known [20] that the number of primes #P k in the interval [2 k , 2 k+1 ] is lower bounded as
Also, we have
as long as the condition #P k − (t − 1) ≥ #P k /2 holds, which using (9) is implied by the condition
Plugging (9) and (10) in (8) we find, assuming (11), the following sufficient condition for having δ ≤ δ c (i.e. δ c -correctness):
Now, using B A + H = ( A + 1) H ≤ 2 A H (since A ≥ 1) and assuming the condition
so that H = 2 α·k−1 , the condition (12) becomes 2 2t +t+(t +1)Γ CV P n t ((t + α)k + 2Γ CV P + t) t ≤ 2 ((1−α)t −t)·k δ c . Using α < 1,
c ) ≤ log(δ −1 c n), (2t + t + (t + 1)Γ CV P )/t ≤ 2Γ CV P + 3 (since t/t ≤ 1 and t ≥ 1), and log((t + 1)(k + 1) + 2Γ CV P ) ≤ log(4kt + 2Γ CV P ) ≤ 2 + log(kt + Γ CV P ) (using t ≥ 1 and k ≥ 1), we finally get the following sufficient condition for δ c -correctness (assuming k ≥ 5, (11) and (13)):
The condition (14) is satisfied by the scheme parameter choice δ F = (
Finally we observe, using t /t > 1 that (15) implies that k − log k ≥ log n + ( t /t t /t−1 )(log(δ −1/t c t) + 6) ≥ log t +2 so that k ≥ 5 and (11) are both implied by (15) . Finally, to establish the claimed asymptotic correctness, we observe that with δ c = k −t = o(1), the right-hand side of (15) is O(log k) so, since log k = o(k), (15) is satisfied for all sufficiently large k. This completes the proof.
Security
The concrete security of our scheme is given by the following result. It shows that, for fixed (t , n), and with δ c = δ s = k −t = o(1), our (t , n) scheme leaks at most fraction o(1) of the entropy of the secret as long as less than t − t /t subshares are observed by the attacker. For example if we increase the threshold from t to t = 2t, then we have almost perfect security as long as t s < t − t /t = t − 2 shares are observed by the attacker (we can of course choose a slightly larger t ≈ 2t + 2 if we want to guarantee security against attackers observing up to 2t shares, but then to guarantee reconstruction we would need 2t + 2 subshares to be combined).
We remark that the limitation t s ≤ t − t /t for security is inherent to our approach of adding noise to the subshares and not to our CRT-based implementation. This is because, as noted in Section 4, our approach of increasing the threshold from t to t = R · t by adding about (1 − 1/R )k bits of noise to shares is essentially equivalent to reducing the length of shares by a factor R . Thus each subshare can provide at most k/R bits of information on the secret and since t subshares contain all the information on the secret, it follows that perfect security cannot be achieved when t s > t − R subshares are observed.
We also remark that although we state in Theorem 4.2 a lower bound on the conditional Shannon entropy of the secret H(s ∈ S(k, x)|s I ) for any observed share value s I , our proof shows the stronger result that the stated bound is also a lower bound on the conditional min-entropy H ∞ (s ∈ S(k, x)|s I ) = log(1/ max s∈S(k,x) P k,x (s|s I )) (where P k,x (s|s I ) denotes the conditional probability distribution of s given s I ), and hence also a lower bound on the conditional Rényi entropy of s given s I . This means we can apply the privacy amplification results of [3] to derive a secret s (by hashing s with a public randomly chosen function from a universal hash family) such that a provably negligible absolute amount of entropy of s is leaked by the observed shares s I .
Note that for improved readability of the proof of Theorem 4.2, the proofs of some lemmas have been placed in the Appendix. 
where a = s + r · p 0 is uniformly distributed on Z Z A .
It follows from the above that the conditional probability P k,x (s|s I ) of the secret taking the value s ∈ Z Z p 0 given the observed sub-share vector s I is given by:
Using the fact that for each a ∈ Z Z A there is at most one r I ∈ (−H, H) ts such that
) for all j ∈ [t s ], the above simplifies to:
where for integers ( s, p 0 ) we define the set S s, p 0 by
We will derive a probabilistic lower bound on #S 0,1 and upper bound on #S s,p 0 which both hold for all except a fraction δ I ≤ δ s / n ts of 'bad' choices for p I ∈ D((P k ) ts ) assuming k satisfies the inequality (16) (with t s and δ s defined in the theorem statement). We then apply these bounds to (17) to get a bound P k,x (s|s I ) ≤ 2 s /p 0 for all s (with s defined in the theorem statement) so that for fixed I, entropy loss is bounded as L k,x (s I ) ≤ s , except for fraction δ I of p I ∈ D((P k ) ts ). It then follows that L k,x (s I ) ≤ s for all I ⊆ [n] with #I = t s except for a fraction δ ≤ n ts δ I ≤ δ s of p ∈ D((P k ) n ) assuming that k satisfies (16) , which proves the theorem. Reduction to Lattice Point Counting. It remains to derive lower and upper bounds on the size of the set S s, p 0 . The following lemma reduces this problem to finding lower and upper bounds on the number of points #V s, p 0 of a certain lattice in a certain box. 
and define the vector
Then the sizes of the following two sets are equal: This reduction can be precisely stated as follows. 
To solve the "homogenous" problem (1) above we apply the Blichfeldt-Corput generalization of Minkowski's "first theorem" in the geometry of numbers (Theorem 2.2 in Sec.
, where
, and the volume of the box {v ∈ IR ts+1 : v ∞ < H − } is [2(H − )] ts+1 , we find, using the fact that Int(z)
To solve the second problem (2) above of upper bounding the (t s + 1)th Minkowski minimum λ ts+1 (L CRT (p I , A, B, H, p 0 )), we apply Minkowski's "second theorem" in the geometry of numbers (Theorem 2.3 in Sec. 2) to reduce this problem to the problem of lower bounding the first Minkowski minimum
Lower Bounding the first Minkowski Minimum. By applying the number-theoretic Lemma 2.1(Sec. 2), we obtain the following (probabilistic) lower bound on λ 1 (L CRT (p I , A, B, H, p 0 )). A, B, H, p 0 , t s ) , and real β > 0 such that k ≥ 5, k − log k ≥ log t s + 2, p 0 is a divisor of A, and A/ p 0 ≥ 2 k ≥ 2H. If the condition
Lemma 4.3. Fix positive integers (k,
holds, then for at least a fraction 1 − 2
Note that A = p 0 P t−1 depends on p I whereas our Lemma 4.3 assumes that A is a fixed integer. However, it is easy to see that if A L = p 0 2 (t−1)k denotes a fixed lower bound on A then #S s,p 0 (p I , A, B, H, s I ) ≤ S s,p 0 (p I , A H , B, H, s I ). So, fixing β > 0 (to be determined later) and applying Lemma 4.3 with A = A L and ( s, p 0 ) = (0, 1), we have, except for a fraction of at most
of p I ∈ D(P ts k ) and assuming conditions
and
. The latter bound and Minkowski's second theorem give λ ts+1 (L CRT (p I , A, B, H, 1 A, B, H, 1)) 1 ts+1 , and so using Lemma 4.2 we have #v 0,1 (p I ) ≥ #{v ∈ L CRT (p I , A, B, H, 1) : v ∞ < H/2} as long as
Applying the Blichfeldt-Corput theorem to the box {v ∈ Q ts+1 : v ∞ < H/2}, we get #v 0,1 A,B,H,1) ) + 1 and using 2Int(z) + 1 ≥ 2z − 1 ≥ z for all z ≥ 2, we conclude that
except for a fraction δ I (1) of p I ∈ D(P ts k ) bounded in (21) , and assuming that conditions (22), (23), (24) and (25) hold. Note that condition (24) is satisfied because A = p 0 P t−1 ≥ P t−1 ≥ 2 k assuming t ≥ 2 (we may assume this because for t = 1, t s = 0 so the theorem is trivially true), and 2H < 2 αk ≤ 2 k since α ≤ 1. Also note that using β > 0 and assuming t s ≥ t (as we will explain below, our our analysis need only apply for t ≥ t s ), we see that the right-hand inequality in (22) is implied by (25).
Finding an Upper Bound on #V s,p 0 (p I ).
We reduce the problem of upper bounding #V s,p 0 (p I , A, B, H, s I ) to the problem of lower bounding the first Minkowski minimum λ 1 (L CRT (p I , A, B, H, p 0 ) ), and then apply Lemma 4.3. The reduction can be stated as follows. 
holds. To apply the lower bound of Lemma 4.3, we let A H = p 0 2 (t−1)(k+1) be a fixed upper bound on A. Then applying the lemma with A = A H and (uhs, p 0 ) = (s, p 0 ) we have, except for at most a fraction
of p I ∈ D(P ts k ), assuming conditions (23) and (24) and
. Plugging this into the above upper bound on #V s, p 0 , we obtain
except for at most a fraction δ I (p 0 ) of p I ∈ D(P ts k ) bounded in (28) and assuming conditions (27) and (29). Notice that the left-hand inequality of (29) and (27) are both implied by the condition
Putting it Together. Plugging our bounds on #V 0,1 = #S 0,1 and #V s,p 0 = #S s,p 0 from (26) and (30) into (17) we obtain
as claimed (with β to be determined), for all except at most a fraction δ I of p I ∈ D(P ts k ), where, using (21) and (28),
and assuming the conditions (23), (25), the left-hand inequality in (22) , the left-hand inequality in (29) and (31). Now recall that to achieve the claimed δ s ≤ δ c we need to show that δ I ≤ δ c n ts
Using the upper bound (33), and recalling that B/H = 2 Γ CV P and A H = p 0 2 (t−1)(k+1) ≤ 2 t(k+1) so log(2 k+2 B H A H ) ≤ 4kt + Γ CV P + 1, we see that the desired bound δ I ≤ δ c n ts −1 is satisfied by choosing
as in the theorem statement.
We now show that the inequality (16) satisfied by k implies the assumed conditions (23), the left-hand inequality in (22) , and the left-hand inequality in (29). To see this, note that both the left-hand inequality in (22) , and the left-hand inequality in (29) are satisfied if
But assuming 2 α·k−1 ≥ 2 (36)
we have 2H ≥ 2 αk−1 and using α = 1 − 1+δ F t /t , t s ≥ t, and the definition of δ F = t /t k θ(k) with θ(k) = log(δ −1/t c n(kt + Γ CV P )) + 2Γ CV P + 5 we see after straightforward algebraic manipulation that (35) and also (36) and (23) are all satisfied as long as k satisfies the inequality
which is implied by (16 
Using p 0 ≥ 2 k−1 , log(t s + 1) ≤ t s + 1 (since t s ≥ 1), we find that (38) is implied by k ≥ (β + 3)(t s + 1) 2 + 1, which is in turn implied by (16) . Now, (31) is implied by the condition t /t (where the last inequality follows from the choice of β and k satisfying (34) and (37)), we conclude that both (25) and (31) are satisfied as long as
which is satisfied by the theorem hypothesis t s =
This completes the proof of the claimed values for (t s , δ s , s ) and the inequality for k. However, note that our arguments above also assumed that t s = t −t /t 1+δ F ≥ t. For the case t s < t, we can apply the security bound in [19] for the standard CRT secret-sharing scheme. This bound gives s ≤ log(2p 0 /C(I)) for any I ⊆ [n] with #I = t s < t, where C(I) = P t−1 ν∈I pν . Using P t−1 ≥ 2 (t−1)k and ν∈I p ν ≤ 2 (t−1)(k+1) , we get C(I) ≥ p 0 /2 t−1 ≥ p 0 /2 t assuming k ≥ t + 1 (which is implied by (16) ). So for t s < t, we have s ≤ log(2p 0 /(p 0 /2 t )) ≤ t + 1, so our claimed bound s = max((β + 4)(t s + 1), t + 1) holds also for t s < t (for all public parameters). Finally, to establish the asymptotic security claim, note that when δ c = k −c for some constant c > 0, we get β = O(log k) and θ = O(log k), so (16) is satisfied for sufficiently large k and s = O(log k) so the fraction of lost entropy s /k = o(1). This completes the proof of the theorem.
An immediate consequence of the above results is the following.
Corollary 4.1. The standard (t, n) CRT threshold secret-sharing scheme CRTTSS is asymptotically threshold-changeable to (Int(t − t /t), t ) for any t > t, where Int(z) denotes the largest integer strictly less than z.
Conclusion
We have shown an application of lattice theory to enable threshold-changeability of CRT secretsharing schemes. Our results are analogous to those obtained by lattice methods for the polynomialbased Shamir secret-sharing scheme [23] , despite the differences in the details of the lattices involved.
There are several open problems related to our scheme. The first is to improve our security bounds. Another problem is to extend the application of our 'noisy' Chinese remaindering decoding algorithm. One possible extension is to the method to detecting/identifying cheating shareholders who provide incorrect shares to the share combiner algorithm. A known approach [17] to cheater detection involves using extra 'redundant' shares: the combiner for a (t, n) scheme asks for t > t shares. For the CRT secret sharing scheme, the problem of detecting/correcting up to k incorrect shares is equivalent to error detection/correction for a Chinese Remainder code, where the share error vector has Hamming weight at most k. The cheating detection problem for k ≤ t − t cheaters can be efficiently solved for both the original CRT scheme as well as our threshold-changeable version of it: the combiner applies the (t, n) reconstruction algorithm to any subset of t shares out of the t received shares to recover the integer a and then checks that all t received shares are consistent (for our changeable threshold scheme this means checking that t i −B ·a L,p i < H for all the received subshares t i ). For the cheater identification problem, one could use the Hamming norm error correction algorithms of [8, 5] for the original CRT scheme. However, identifying cheaters efficiently in our changeable threshold scheme requires an error correction algorithm for the CRT code with up to k incorrect shares, and where all the correct CRT shares are corrupted by small additive noise (after multiplication by a known constant). An interesting problem could be to construct such an efficient error correction algorithm (better than trying to combine every subset of t shares and checking for consistency of at least t − k shares), perhaps by combining in some way our Lee norm error correction method with the Hamming norm error correction methods of [8, 5] . and k a = (k a,1 , . . . , k a,ts ) is the unique vector in Z Z ts such that
To show that f is a well-defined mapping from S s, p 0 to V s, p 0 , we need to show that for each a = k a · p 0 + s ∈ S s, p 0 there exists a unique k a ∈ Z Z ts satisfying (41). To show that k a satisfying (41) is unique, note that for any k = (k 1 , . . . , k ts ) ∈ Z Z ts which is not equal to k a , there exists a coordinate j ∈ [t s ] for which k j = k a,j + u for some non-zero integer u, and this implies that |v ka, (41) is not satisfied by k, and k a is unique as claimed.
To show that f is 1-1, we simply observe that for any distinct pair a (1) 
a so the lattice vectors f (a (1) ) and f (a (2) ) differ in the (t s + 1)th coordinate. Hence f is 1-1.
To show that f is onto, observe that any vector v in V s,p has the form v = v ka,ka defined in (40) for some k a ∈ Z Z and k a = (k a,1 , . . . , k a,ts ) ∈ Z Z ts , and satisfies (41). Let a = k a p 0 + s. Then by construction we know that f (a) = v ka,ka , and it remains to show that a ∈ S s, p 0 . Indeed, (41) implies that
and hence a ∈ S s, p 0 , as required, and f is onto. This completes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 4.2
We lower bound the number of lattice points in the box K 1 = {v ∈ IR ts+1 : v − s I ∞ < H} of side length 2H which is centered on the non-lattice vector s I , by the number of lattice points in the box K 2 = {v ∈ IR ts+1 : v − s I ∞ < H − } of side length 2(H − ), which is centered on a lattice vector s I . We obtain the lattice vector s I by 'rounding' the non-lattice vector s I to a 'nearby' lattice vector. Suppose that the 'rounding error' s I − s I ∞ = . Then it is easy to see by the triangle inequality that the box K 2 defined above is fully contained within the box K 1 , and thus the number of lattice points inside K 2 is indeed a lower bound on the number of lattice points in K 1 . In turn, since any lattice is invariant under additions of any lattice vector, it follows that the number of lattice points in the box K 2 is equal to the number of points in the origin-centered box {v ∈ IR ts+1 : v ∞ < H − }, which is the desired result.
It remains to prove the claimed bound on the rounding error = s I − s I ∞ . By definition of the (t s + 1)th Minkowski minimum λ ts+1 of the lattice, we know that there exists a set (b 1 , . . . , b ts+1 ) of t s + 1 linearly-independent lattice vectors such that b j ∞ < λ ts+1 for all j = 1, . . . , t s + 1. Note that although the vectors (b 1 , . . . , b ts+1 ) do not necessarily form a basis for the lattice, they do necessarily form a basis for the vector space IR ts+1 over IR. Hence any vector s I ∈ IR ts+1 can be expanded as s I = c 1 b 1 + · · · + c ts+1 b ts+1 for some real coefficients c 1 , . . . , c ts+1 . Now let s I denote the lattice vector which is obtained by rounding the coefficients c 1 , . . . , c ts+1 to the nearest integers, i.e. we let . Now, using B ≥ H and B ≥ 1 we have B A + H ≤ 2 B A. Also we know [20] that #P k ≥ 2 k−1 k −1 for all k ≥ 5 and hence #P ts k /#D(P ts k ) ≤ 2 ts using #P k − (t s − 1) ≥ #P k /2 which is implied by the hypothesis k − log k ≥ log t s + 2 (these inequalities are obtained as in the proof of Theorem 4.1). Plugging these bounds in the above inequality for δ we get 
where P I,max = 2 (k+1)ts is an upper bound on P I . Now, observing that det(L CRT (p I , A, B, H, p 0 )) = 
D Proof of Lemma 4.4
Let N denote the number of points of the lattice L in the box K 1 = {v ∈ IR n : v − s ∞ < H}. Suppose that on each lattice point v in the box , we center an open box S v = {z ∈ IR n : z − v ∞ < λ 1 (L)/2} of side length λ 1 (L)/2. Note that as v runs through all lattice vectors in the box K 1 , the boxes S v are disjoint (because by the triangle inequality, the existence of a vector z in two of the boxes S v 1 and S v 2 implies that v 1 − v 2 ∞ < λ 1 (L), which is a contradiction since v 1 − v 2 is itself a lattice vector), and occupy a total volume N · λ 1 (L) n .
On the other hand, applying the triangle inequality again, we have that all the above N disjoint boxes S v are contained within the box K 2 = {z ∈ IR n : v − s ∞ < H + λ 1 (L)/2}, which has volume V ol(K 2 ) = (2H + λ 1 (L)) n .
It follows that
and therefore,
as required. This completes the proof.
